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1 In tro duc ti on
In m an ya p p l ic at i o ns econo m ic theory a ssum es tha t go v ernm en ts a re c ha racte riz ed b y
li m i ted com m itm en t. Lim i ted com m itm en t, fo r exam ple ,e xplains the ne ed for indep en-
den t cen t ra l ba nki ng
1
, cons ti tution a nd l a w
2
, an d the threat o f th e ra t c het e￿ e ct. The
questi on w h yg o v e rn m en ts are c hara c teri zed b yl im i ted com m itm e n ti sh o w ev er ha rdl y
ex pl ored. This pa p er addresses exactl y thi sq ue stion in the c on t ext of the ratc he t e￿ect.
More sp e ci￿c al ly , the pa p er studie s the dyna m ic so f r e gu l at i o n with asym m etri c infor-
m ation in a p oli tic a l econo m y .A g o v e rnm en t regu l ates a ￿rm wi th p ri v at e inform ation
ab out its c o st of pro ducti on . T he regulato ry p e rio d co v e rs t w o p erio ds in whic h the ￿rm ’s
pro ducti o n costs do no t c ha nge. Ea rl ier l ite ra ture (e .g. W e itz m an (19 76), H ol m str￿ om
(19 82 ) ) a rgues that in suc he n v ironm en ts g o v ernm e n ts are prone to the i nfa m o us ratc het
e￿ec t. That is, they wi ll m ak e their regulato ry s c hem e dep enden t o n the inform ation
whic hi s rev ealed b y the ￿rm . This b e ha v ior re du c es the ￿rm ’ s ince n tiv e to rev eal its
inform ati o n and i ncre a ses the so c ial cost a sso c iated with the asym m etric inform ation
b et w e en regulato r and ￿rm .
3
More re cen t a nalyse s sho w, ho w ev er, th at the ra tc het e ￿e ct i sc rucial ly re lated to
li m i ted com m itm e n t. B a ron a nd B esa nk o (198 4) sh o w that w i th full com m i tm en ta r e g-
ulator will com m it not to us e the i nfo rm at i o n that the ￿rm rev eals. H ence , the re gu l a tor
is not suscepti ble to the ratc he t e￿ec t. In con trast, when the re g ulator’s c om m itm en ti s
li m i ted, the ratc he te ￿e ct o cc urs (F reix a s, Guesnerie , a nd Tirole 198 5 a nd L a￿o n t and
Tirole 198 8,19 90). The reaso n fo r thi si s stra i gh tfo rw a rd. As a dire ct co nseq uence of the
as sum e d form of lim ite d com m itm e n t, the regulato r is unable to resist us i ng the re v e al ed
inform ati o n a nd the ratc he te ￿e ct s te ps i n.
Cu rre n tm o del s of regulati o n o￿er t w o na tural form so fl im ited com m i tm en t whic h
cause the ratc he te ￿e c t: in tertem p oral n on-com m i tm en t and the lac k of com m i tm en tt o
con tracts whic h cre at e ex p o st ine￿ cie ncie s (renego t iation). In the cas e of in tertem p ora l
non -com m itm en ti t is a ssum ed that the regulato r i s unable t o com m it to long ter m
con tracts and h as to recon tract at m ul tipl ei n stances. This app roac h has b e en ta k en b y
F re ixas, G uesner ie, and Tirole (19 85) and La ￿o n t and Tirole (19 88). Th e ratc he te ￿e ct
oc curs, b e ca use at eac h con tracti ng stag e the re gu l a tor will t ypi call yu s ea l l inform ation
a v ailable . T hat is, also the i nfo rm at i o n whic h the ￿rm has re v e al ed in earli er p e rio ds.
Th e other case of l im ited com m i tm en ti n w h i c h the ratc he t e￿ect o btains, is the case of
rene g otiation. The as sum pti o n here i s tha t the re gu l a tor is unable to us e con tracts whic h
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E.g . Cukierm an (19 92) or R ogo ￿( 1 985)
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Co ns i de r Mil ton F ri ed m a n’s idea that the m onetary gro wth rate s houl d b e written in to t he cons ti -
tution to r esolv e the tim ei nc onsi s ten cy probl em ra ise d i n Kydla n d and Pr es cott (19 77).
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cause ex p ost i ne￿c ienc ies. The regulato r, when faced w i th suc ha ni ne￿c ienc y ,c a nnot
resi s t to re ne g otiate it a w a y .S i nce oth e re cono m ic ag en ts an tic ipate future renego ti at i on ,
theyw i ll ada pt the ir b eha vi or ac c o rdi ng l y and, from an e x ante v ie wpoi n t, the li m i ted
com m itm e n th urts the re gu l a tor. Dynam i cr e gu l at i on un d e r renegotiation i s s tudi ed
b y La ￿on ta n dT i role (19 90). They sho w that the ra tc het e￿ec ti sl ess sev ere than in
the c as e of i n terte m p o ral non-com m i tm en t, b ecause the reg ul a tor has a l a rger d e gr e eo f
c o m m itm e n t.
Al tho ugh the l iterature sho ws tha t the ra tc het e ￿e ct i sc rucial ly l ink ed to li m i ted
com m itm e n t, it do es no t expl ai nw h yr e gu l a tors do not p oss e s s full c om m itm en t. The
curre n t p ap er fo cuses exactl yo n t h i si ss ue . It is ba sed o n the ide a tha t regulato r s are
ulti m atel yg o v e rnm en ts a nd that ￿rm s a re often re gu l a ted o v e r a tim e p eri o d whic h
com pri s e s an in term e diate el ecti o n. Thi s pap e r a sks the que st i on h o wa g o v erning pa rt y
wil l, wi th the i n trinsic a bi li t yo ff u l lc om m itm en t, regulate a ￿rm o v er a p erio d in whic h
in term e diate ele cti o ns tak ep l ac e.
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In order to ans w e r the que st i o n, o ne ￿rst has to
note that t h e go v e rning part yd o e sn o tw an tt ol os e the in term e diate ele ctions. The
regulatory sc hem e to the ￿rm m us t the refore b e su c h tha t i t g uaran tee s the part y ’s
ree lec tion. Th i si m pli es t h at the sc hem em ust not giv e t h e op pos i tion part ya na d v an tage
at the i n te rm edi at e e lec tion. As a dire ct consequenc e, the go v er ni ng part y cannot o￿er
the optim a l full com m itm en tc on t ra ct ,e v e n tho ugh it is ab l et oo ￿ e r it. A s expl ai ned
b efore, this con tract is i n tende dt oi nduce the ￿rm to rev eal i ts priv ate inform ati o n, but
com m its the pa rt y not to use it in the second p eri o d. Suc hal o ng term con tract will
m ak e the g o v erni ng pa r t y lose the in term e diate el ecti o ns. By usi ng the ￿rm ’ sr e v e al ed
inform ati on , t h e opp ositi o n pa rt yi s able to prom i s e the el ectorate a higher so cial w el fare
and there b y win el ecti o ns.
As thi s p ape r s h o ws , the equi li brium o utcom e dep ends on the opp ositi o n part y ’s
pla y ing ￿el d: What k ind of con tracts c a n it o￿ er the ￿rm in case i ti s e lec ted? I study
t w os c e na ri o s, whic hm a yb ei n terprete da st w o p olar cases. I n the ￿rst sce na ri oI
as sum e that the ￿ rm c an i ns i st on the e xec ution of the o l d con tract. T hi si m pli es, that
the opp ositi o n part y can only o ￿er c on tra c ts whi c hy iel d the ￿rm at l e a s ta sm uc ha st h e
old con tract. A si t turns o ut this scenario i se quiv ale n t to the case o f renegotiation as
studied in La￿ on t a nd Ti ro l e (199 0). One o f the m ai n resul ts is the refore th at a s i m pl e
pol iti ca l e co nom ym a ye x plain the ad ho c a ssum ption of l im i ted c om m itm en t in La ￿on t
and Tirole (1 99 0).
Th e second scenario as sum e st h a t , i fac ha nge of go v e rnm en to c c u rs, the ￿rm is
una bl et oi ns i st on the e xec ution o f the old con tract. I f t h e op pos i tion pa rt yw i ns the
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el ecti on s, then the old co n tra c t b ecom e s redunda n t and the o pp o si tion part y is able to
o￿ er a n yc on t ra ct to the ￿rm .I n this c a se the ￿rm ’ s original outside o pti on b e c om es
im p ortan t ag ain and li m it s the new g o v ernm en t’ s barga i ning p o w e r. The sc ena ri oh a s
m an y features in com m on with the ra t c het m od e ls tha t a re ba se do ni n ter tem p o ral no n-
com m itm e n ta sF rei x a s ,e ta l . (198 5) an d L a￿ on t and T i role (198 8). I wi ll, ho w ev er,
sho w tha t the scenario is not eq uiv alen tt oam o del of in tertem p oral non- c om m itm en t.
Surprisingly ,s o c ial w el fa re i ne q uil ibrium m ay b e higher tha n un de r the ￿rst sce na ri o.
In fact when the re is no " c ro wd i ng -out" e ￿e ct of g o v ernm en tal taxation, p oli tic a l pa rti es
can costlessly circ um v en t the li m i ted com m itm e n t whic h is due to the p o l iti cal ec o nom y
and so c ial w el fa re i n equil ibri um is jus t as hi g h as without in te rm edi at e e lec tions.
In ad di tion to o￿ e ring a n ex plan ati o n for the li m it ed com m i tm en to fg o v e rnm en ts ,
this pap e r further iden ti￿es a c o s to fd e m oc r ac y . A (rep eated) de m oc r a cy underm i nes
com m itm e n t a nd m a y the reb yr e du c e soc i al w e lfare. There ex ist t w o (highly) st yl iz ed
facts, whic h i ndicate that the s e cos ts o f de m oc r ac y m a y indee db e i m p ortan t. Fi rst, the
predi ctions o f them ode l are c o nsiste n t with the r ecession seen i n Spa i n a fte rF ranco’s
dem ise. During F ranco’s dictorial regim e S pain’ se c o nom y b ecam e hea v ily re gu l at e d.
Af ter hi s death a de m oc ra c yw as i ns tall ed, but the scop e of re gu l at i on w a s no t reduce d.
It i s rem ark ab l eh o w dra m at i cally Sp ai n’ sG D Pp e r hea d fe ll d uri ng the t ra nsiti on t o
ad e m oc ra c y .E v e n after t w o dec ad e s Spain’s GD P p er head has sti ll not rega i ned its
rel at i v el ev el as com pared to the Euro p ean a v erage of the pre-dem o cratic e ra . Dere gu -
lati on i n Spa i n’s e cono m y has only rece n tly b e com e a n iss ue .
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Sec o nd, s i nce the ratc het
e￿ec t is esp e ciall y h arm f ul i ne c o nom i es whic h are m ore re gu l at e d, the ide n ti￿e d cost of
ad e m oc ra c yi sa l s o higher in suc he c o nom ie s. A ni m pl ic at i o n of m ym o del i s there fore
that, c et eris p aribus, one w ould e xp e ct he av il y regulated econo m ies to b e l ess dem o-
c r atic . This m a yi ndeed b e obs e rv e di n the m ore ce n trall y planned econo m ie s , suc ha s
t h ef o rm er So vi et U ni o n and Chi na . Th e y tend to b e le s s dem o cratic than less regulated
ec on o m i es, suc h a s the US and w e st e rn Europ e .
A sim i lar c o s to fd e m o cracy has b e en iden t i￿ed b yC u k ier m a n an d Me ltze r (198 6)
i nad i ￿e ren tc on te xt. They ex pl ain a go v e rnm en t ’s, so c iall yh a r m ful prefere nce for
discre tiona ry p olic ie sb yap o l i tic al e con om y .C o n tra ry to this pap er, the cost i sl ink ed
to the e xiste nc e o f asym m etric inform ation b et w een the go v e rn m en t and the e lec to rate,
rather th an the go v ernm e n t and som e thi rd part y .C u k ierm a n an d Me ltze r do not a ddress
the issue of re gu l at i on .
T om y kno wledge the only o the r pap er wh i c h trie s to expl ai n the l im ite d com m i tm e n t
of g o v ernm en ts i na r e gu l at i on c on te xt i s La￿ on t and T i ro l e (199 3). Th e y ,h o w ev er,
5
Econom i st , Dec em b er 14th 19 96.5
deri v e the l im ited com m i tm en t as a n optim a l resp o nse of the general publ ic to h arm f ul
coll usion b e t w e en the go v ernm en t a nd ￿rm s. T he ex plana ti on of l i m ite d com m itm en ti s
t h e re fo re funda m en tall y di￿ere n t from this pap e r. I ti sar e m e dy to s om e o the r pro bl em .
In the presen t p ape r l im i ted c om m itm en t d oe s n ot ha v ea n y p ositi v e e￿ects, bu t is
nev erthel ess obtained endog e no usly .
Only re m otely related to the presen t pap e r a re Sc hm i dt (1 99 7) an d B iais an d P e ro tti
(19 97) , wh o b oth s tudy pri v at i zation i na p o l itic a l econo m y . They lo o k i n to the i ncen tiv es
of p oli tical parti es to arra nge sp e ci ￿ c pu bl ic owner sh i p struc tu re s. The pa p ers do not
add re ss the issue of re gu l at i o n, n or the issue o f c om m itm en t.
Finall y ,s i nce thi s pap e r is ba sed on the ide a that regulation is p oli tic al ly i m por t an t,
its rele v an c e dep ends strong l y on whether this i s indee d the cas e . I, theref or e , pre se n ta
c a s e s t u d y o f t h e 199 7 general e le ction i n th e Uni ted Ki ng dom , whi c h ￿ts m an y features
of the m o del and sh o ws th at regulation is i ndeed p o l iti cally i m p o rtan t.
2 The m od el
The p oli tic al e cono m yi sm od e led as i nD o wns (19 57):




, whose so l e inte r est is to
gov ern.
Elec tions a re m o del ed as foll o ws . Jus t b e fore an e lec tion tak e s place, the p ol itic al
p a r ties p os t el ecti o n p rogra m s, c al led m an i festos. A m anife st o e xplains to v oters whic h
pol ici es th e part yi n tend to im ple m en t when ele cted. I a ssum e that, when in o ￿ ce,
partiesc a n not div erge from t he ir m an i festo a nd i m ple m en ts o m e other p o l ic y . The
m anife sto com m its the pa rt y full y t oac ertain b e ha vior. I do not expl ic itly m o del the
so urc e of this c om m it m en t, but p oin t to conce rns o f reputation. If a part yc he at s on c e
on i ts m anife s to, v ot e rs wil l nev e r trust the p art y’s p rom i ses aga i n, and i tw i ll nev er b e
ree lec ted.
6
Ass um ption 2 A l l vote r sa r ei de ntic al and vote r ational l y .
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In f act , since I ass um e that pa rt i e s onl yc a r e ab out b eing el e ct ed and si n ce it turns o ut th a t, i n
equil ibrium , an elect ed p a rt yi s re elec ted, the e l e cte d part y has no i nc en tiv e t o breac hi ts program .
This wil lb e d i ￿ ere n ti fIh a d as sum ed s o m e degre e of p ol icy p refer enc es. In thi s case the re putati on
m ec hanism do e s b ec o m ei m p ortan ta nd gi v en the fa c t tha t the e l e cte d part yi s re elec ted su￿ce s t o dete r
c he ati ng.6
When v oters are ide n tic al i ti s natura l to a ssum e the exi st e nce of a so c ial w el fare
functi o n whic hp u t se q ua l w eigh ts on the co nsum e r’s a nd ￿rm ’ s s urpl u s. I a ssum e that
v o te rs w an t the go v ernm e n tt o m ax im i ze so c ial w e lfare. Gi v en the parti es’ m anife s tos
v ot e rs are able to full ya n tic ipate the b eha vi o r of the parties once el ec ted. Rati o nali t yo f
v o t i ng the ni m pl ie s tha t t he e l ectorate wil lv ote for the pa rt y whic h prom ises the highest
so ci al w el fa re .
Since p arti es a re o nl yi n t erested i ng o v erning, they w i ll com pe te for the v ot e rs b y
com m itti ng to el ecti o n pro gram s. As o ne can e as i ly see, i n a one sh ot ele cti o n the
only eq uili brium i s one in whic h pa rti es co m m i tt he m sel v e st o a c ting ful ly i n the v oters
in terest, i. e. c om m itti ng to a m anif esto whic hm axim ize ss o c ial w el fare. Sinc e b oth
parties o ￿er the sam em anife s to, i ti s uncl ear w hi c h part yi se l ecte d. T oc i rcum v e n t this
prob l em I ado pt the tie-breaki ng rule that i fv oters are indi ￿e ren t, they v o te for the
go v e rn i ng part y .I fn o p a r t yi si ng o v ernm e n t, v oters e lec t p art y1 .
T h e p u r p o s e o f t h i sp a p e ri st oi n v estigate re gu l at i on i nap o l i tic al e c o nom y . I will
there fo re abstra c tf ro m all o ther i s sues whic hm a y pla y a role in a n ec o nom y :
Ass um ption3 The g overnme nt’s onl y t a sk is to r e gul a t e a ￿rm o v er two p erio ds. The
￿rm has private in f ormation a b out its c ost func tion.
In order to enable a m eaningful com pariso n to exi sting m ode ls I wil l a naly ze the
sta ndard regulation m o del dev e lop e db y L a￿o n t and T i role (19 88, 1 990 , 199 3). This
regulation m od e li sa sf o l lo ws:
Th e regulated ￿rm m a yr e al ize an indi visi bl e pro j ect w hi c hh a s v alue S for c o nsum e rs .










g is a tim e-in v arian te ￿ cie ncy pa ram ete r and e
￿
th e ￿rm ’s e ￿ ort. Onl y
the ￿rm kno ws the e￿c ienc y pa ram e ter ￿ . A ll o ther pl a y e rs ha v e the com m o n prior
b eli ef Pro b(￿ = ￿
l
)=￿ a nd Pro b(￿ = ￿
h
)=1 ￿ ￿ .
Th e disuti lit yo fe ￿ ort for the ￿rm is   (e) and i s kno wn to all pa rti es. I ti si ncre a sing
in e￿o rt a t an inc reas i ng ra te ( 
0
> 0,  
00
> 0). T o exc lude co r ne r solutions I as sum e that
  (0 ) = 0 ,  
0




)= + 1 .I n o rde r to ensure the optim al it yo f d e term i nisti c
con tracts ra the r than s to c hastic ones t he t ec hn i cal as sum pti on  
0 00
￿ 0i sm ain taine d.
F ollo wi ng L a￿o n t and Tir ol e, I as sum e that the co st is o bserv able , bu t that e ￿ ort is
not obs e rv ab l e. I us e La ￿on t and Ti ro l e’s a c co un ting con v en tion that for e v e ry p eri od
￿ =1 ; 2 the regulator com pe ns ates the ￿ rm ’s cost a nd, i n a ddi tion, pa ys the ￿rm a
m onetary t ra nsfer t
￿
,w h i c hm a y dep end on the realiz ed c o st. Th e ￿rm ’ s util it y ,o r7
pro￿ t, a t tim e ￿ ,d e pe nd s only o n the tra nsfer t
￿
and its e xp e nded e￿o rt e
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.H ere I e xtend La￿ on t and Tirole ’s regulati on m o del a nd e xpress
the di sto rti on b y a general func tion ￿(T ). I as sum e tha t the distortion i si ncre a sing
with the ta xati o n and m arg i na l ly so, i .e. ￿
0
(: ) > 0a n d￿
00
(:) ￿ 0 . Dra wing a para l le lt o
go v e rn m en tal le nd i ng I wil li n te rpret the con v exi t yo f ￿ ( : )a sam easure of cr owdi ng -o ut.
If the di s torti on i sl i near (i. e. ￿
00
(: ) = 0) the go v ernm en t can cos tl essly tra nsfe r taxes
be t w e en the t w o p eri o ds throug h b o rro wing a nd le nd i ng and there i s no cro wding- out
e￿ec t. When ￿
0 0
(: ) > 0, a cro wding-o ut e￿ect of taxation e xists a nd the go v ernm e n t
optim al taxation pl a n is to tax the sa m ea m ou n ti n b oth p eri o ds.
Gi v en tha t th e pro ject is reali zed, s o ci al w el fa re is the sum o f c o nsum er ’s a nd ￿rm ’s
surplus and can b e written as
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(C )) + U
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In this pa p er I wil l a naly ze three sc ena ri o’ s:
Sce na ri o 0 (no in term e diate ele cti o n): Th e re is no e le ction b et w een the t w o stag e s.
Sce na ri o 1 (re neg oti at i o n): There is a n el ec tion b et w een the t w o s tages. I f the
v ot e rs ele ct the opp ositi o n part y a t the in t erm e di ate el ecti o n, then the ￿rm can
i ns i s t on the e xec ution of the fo rm er con tract.
Sce na ri o 2 (no n-com m i tm e n t): There is an e lec tion b et w e en the t w o s tages. If the
v o te rs ele ct the o pp o siti on pa r t y a t the in term e diate e lec tion, then the o l dg o v ern-
m e n t’s con tract b e com es redundan t. T he ￿rm c a nnot i nsist o n its con tin ua ti on .
Iw ould l ik e to stress that in all three s c enario’s the g o v erning part y ,i .e. the regulato r,
has ful lc om m itm en tp o w er .I n eac h sce na ri oi t is able to c redibl y com m it to an yl on g
term con tract, ev en i f the c on tract t u rns out to b e ex p o st i ne￿ cie n t. Regulation is
there fo re no t d i rec tly s ub j ect to an y kind of ratc he t e￿ect. An y fo rm of ratc heti ng is
caused endo genous l y .
Note further th at i f the repl ac em e n t of the go v e rning pa rt yb y t h e op pos i tion pa rt y
w ere exog e no usly e nfo rc ed, the ratc he te ￿ e ct o btains. Sce na ri o 1 is then iden tical to
La ￿o n t and Tirole (199 0), wh i le s c enario 2 i si den ti cal to La￿ on ta n dT i ro l e (1 988 ). The
inno v ation of this pap e r is that the re pl acem en ti s deci ded endog e no usly b ym eans of an
el ecti on .8
L ast, I a ssum e tha t the m anife st o a t the ￿rst e lec tion i n v ol v e sat w o -p erio d c on tract.
Sinc ei ti s c om m on kno wle dg e that all pl a y e rs are ra ti o nal, this assum ption i s without
loss of generali t y .P artie s can im plem en ta n y com bination of t w o one-p erio d con tracts
throu gh o ne ,t w o-p e rio d con tract without a￿ e cti ng the inc en ti v e so fa n y of the pla y ers.
Be fo re studying the thre e sce na ri o’ s I wil l brie￿y ana l yze the case of s y m m e tric infor-
m ation, i n whi c h the ￿rm ’ st yp e is o bserv able . Thi s giv es us a b enc hm ark to whi c h one
can c on trast the e￿ect o f a sym m etri c inform ation. When the ￿rm ’s t y p e is o bserv able,
costs are ful ly inform ati v e ab out e￿o rt c ho i ce s and the re, de f ac t o ,d o e sn o te x ist a n y
as y m m e tric i nfo rm at i o n. I de￿ne thi sc a se as the ￿rst b est.
With sym m etri c inform ation, ratc het ing canno t o cc u r dire ctly or indi rectl y . Ratc h-
eti ngo c curs due to e nd ogenou s inform ation rev elation, b ut i naw orl d with sym m etri c
inform ati o n a l la v ail ab l e inform ation is a l ready rev ea l ed. Co nseq uen tl y ,i n t erm e di ate
rev el a ti o n of i nfo rm at i o n is no t a n issue a nd pa rti es wi ll di rectl y com pe te fo r v ot e rs .
The com p eti tion for v oters wi ll cau se pa rti es to a c t in the full in te rest of the e lec to rate.
The problem o f ￿ndi ng the equil ibri um con tract i s therefore e quiv ale n t to the stan dard
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where (1) represen ts the ￿rm ’ s partic ipation c o nstrain t.
Prop osit ion 1 With symmetric informa ti o n t he p ar t ies o ￿e r the ￿rm t im e in variant
c ontr ac ts which le a v en or en ts to e ither ty p e and r e qu i r ea t y p e indep en dent e ￿or t l ev el ,
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thec o ll e ct e d tax es, i 2f l; hg.
Pro of: By setti ng t =   (e) the g o v ernm en t can ex tra c t the ￿rm ’ sr e n tc om plete ly . One
m a yr e wr i te so ci al w el fa re as
W = S ￿ (￿ ￿ e ) ￿   (e ) ￿ ￿(t + C ):
= S ￿ (￿ ￿ e ) ￿   (e ) ￿ ￿(  (e )+￿ ￿e )
The ￿rs t order conditi on s f or a m ax im um w.r.t . e y iel ds
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0
( e )=1 . W i th sym m etri c inform ation the
go v e rn m en tc a n r eso l v e the i nc en ti v e pro bl em com ple tely b y o￿ering a t yp e de p ende n t
pa ym e n ts c hem e t(￿
i
) =   (e) where e i s suc h that  
0
(e ) =1 .
Q . E . D.
3 N o in te rm ediate elec tio n s
In this secti on I analyz e the case of asym m e tric inform ati on w i th out an yi n t erm e di ate
el ecti on s. This m eans that the p art y whic hi se l e cted a t stag e 1, rem ai ns auto m at i call yi n
po w er i n the sec o nd stag e . Since pa rti es com p ete for v o ter sb yc om m itti ng to m an i festos ,
the o nl ye quil ibri um i s one i n whic h b oth parties propos e a m anif esto wh i c hm axi m iz es
so ci al w el fa re . Giv en the ti e-breaki n g rule , part y1 i s the ne le cted and i m pl em e n ts its
w el fare m axim iz ing prog ram .
Th e problem i s theref o re equi v al en t to the pro bl em o f a b e nev ol en t regulato r w i th
full co m m i tm en t who re gu l a tes a ￿rm with priv ate inform ation o v er t w op e r i ods . B a ron
and Besank o (19 84 ) ha v es h o wn that in suc ha s e tting the optim al dyna m ic con tract
is a s trai g h tf or w ard re pe t ition of th e optim a l sta ti c con tract. An e legan t pro o f can b e
found i nF uden b erg a nd Tirol e (1 991 ) and is ba sed on the arg um en t that if the optim al
t w o- p e rio d con tra c tw e re not the t wice rep eated static con tract, the n the static con tract
could not ha v e b een optim al . T he regu l ato r could i nc rease s o ci al w elfare i n th e s tati c
case b y com m i tting to a s tati c con tract whic h rando m ize so v e r the di￿ere n t com po ne n ts
of the optim a l dynam ic con tract. The rea soning le a ds there fo r et oac o n trad i cti o n and
the op ti m al dynam i cc o n tra c tm ust b e a re pe tition o f the optim al sta t ic con tract. In the
foll o wi ng w e der iv e the o pti m al sta ti c con tract.
In the cas e tha t the regulator do es not kno w the ￿rm ’s t yp e as y m m e tric inform ation
ex ists. F o r this s e tting the rev el at i o n princi ple app l ie s an d the regu l ato r cann ot d o b ett er
than prop osing a d i rec tm ec ha ni sm . Due to the ass um ption that  
00 0
> 0t h e optim al








































































I assum e that S is la rg e enough to e nsur e that it is s o cia ll yo pt i m a l for b oth ￿r m st o r e a li ze th e
pro je ct.10
As is standa rd in the s e problem s only the i ncen tiv e co nstrain t of the e￿ cie n tt yp e and
the indi vidual rationa l it y o f the ine ￿ci en tt yp e i sb i nding at the o pti m um
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Note tha t (3) i s conca v ei n e
l
a n d e
h
. F irst o rde r conditi o ns a re there fore su￿c ie n t
for a m axi m um .
Prop osit ion 2 Without in terme diate el e ctions b oth p ar ti es p ost e le c tion pr o gr ams which
maximize so cial we lfar e . Par ty 1 i s chosen and im pl emen ts the se c ond b es t c ont r act which
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the r es p e ct ive tax b ur den s in t he c ase of a low an d hig h c ost ￿rm i nb o th p erio d 1 an d 2.
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the so cial w el fa r ep er p er io di nc ase of a l ow c ost ￿rm an d a hig h c ost ￿ r m, r esp e ctiv el y .
It is i m p o rtan t to stress that, ev e n thoug h the ￿rm ’s b eha vi o r in the ￿ rst sta ge do es
rev eal inform ation abou t i t s t yp e, th e c on tra c ti n the second stag e do e s no t dep end
on i t. This sho ws that with full c om m i tm en ti ti so p t i m al to com m it no t to use a n y
inform ati o n wh i c h the ￿rm re v e al s. S i nce w e obta i ned the result while n ot taking in to
accoun t a p ossible ratc he te ￿e ct, the p o ssibi li t y o f ratc he ting do e s not p o se a proble m
for t he r eg ul a tor.
F urtherm or e , one obta i ns the fam i liar result of " no di st o rti o n at the top" . Onl y the
e￿o r tl e v e l of the i ne ￿ci en t ￿rm i s distorted, wh i le the e￿c ien t ￿rm is the o nl yt yp e to
rec eiv ea r en t. This o bserv ation wi ll b e im p ortan t in the next secti on .11
Finall yn o t et ha t i f ￿ ( : )i s stri ctly c on v e x the equi libri um con tract is unique and
req uires sm o o th ta xati on i n b oth p eri o ds . When ￿(T )i sl inear, there exi s t sa ni nd e ter-
m i nac y con c erni n g the rel at i v ea m oun t o f taxation b et w ee n the t w o p erio ds .
4 In te rm ediate Elections w ith Re nego tiation
In this sec tion I a naly ze the ga m ei n whic he lec tions ta k e place a nd a ssum e tha t the
con tract whic h the go v e rning pa rt y write sw i th t h e ￿rm i s also binding for the other
part y . E ￿ec tiv ely this m eans tha t if the opp ositi o n part y ’s m a nif esto in v olv es a di￿ere n t
con tract, the ￿rm m a y insist o n the exe cution o f the form er con tract. If, ho w ev er, the
￿rm prefe rs the ne w con tract o v er the o l d one, it can exc ha nge the form er con tract for the
new one. Th e o pp os i tion pa rt y can there fo re o nl yi m ple m en ta n e wc on tra c t e￿ecti v e ly ,
if it raises the ￿rm ’ s util it yr e lativ et o th e old con tract. T he rationa l e lec to rate will
correc tly an tic ipate this.
One m a y ca pture the m od e lo fi n te rm edi at e e l ecti o n with re ne g oti at i on b y th e fo l lo w-
ing tim i ng . Be fo r e th e ￿rst el ecti on s t ak e place ,p a r t y 1 a nd 2 publi sh thei rm an i festos ,
whic h co v e r the long te rm con tract to the ￿ rm . Based o n these progra m sv ot e rs e le ct
a part y . Co nseq uen tl y , the el ecte dp a r t y o ￿ers the con tract to th e ￿rm ,w h i c h deci des
whether to acc ept o r reje ct it. The ￿rm then c ho oses its e￿ ort to reduc e cos ts. In case
it acc epted the c on tract, it is com p ensa te da c co r di ng l y . When i t refused the con tract, i t
obta i ns it s outs i de o pti o n of z ero.
Afte r the ￿ rst p eri od i n term edi at e e l ecti o ns tak ep l ac e . Si nc e partie s com m it to a
t w o- p e rio d c on t ra ct at the ￿rst el ecti o n, the parti es’ m anife s tos a re a l ready kno wn and
canno t b e c hang e d.
8
The e lec to rate v otes and determ ines whethe r there is a c h ange
in go v ernm e n t. In the c a s e o fac ha nge, the new go v ernm en t o ￿ers i ts co n tra c tt ot h e
￿ r m .T h e￿ r m can ag ain acce pt o r re ject th e con tract. If i t rejec ts the con tract, i ts t ill
op er a tes under the old c on tract, if a n y . The ￿rm then c ho o ses i ts e￿o rt to re duce c o sts
and , ￿n all y ,i ti sc o m pe ns ated according to the rel ev an t con tract.
Note that rene g otiation i sr e ￿ecte db y the a ssum pti o n that if the ￿rm rejec ts the
con tract o f the new g o v ernm e n t the ol d con tract rem ai ns v al id. T hi si m pli es that the
new co n tra c t only sup e rs e des the o l d one, if b oth the new g o v ernm e n t and the ￿rm ag re e
to i t.
Th e ￿rst que st i on wh i c ha r i ses i sw h e ther the o c currence of an in term e diate e le ction
a￿ ec ts the e quil ibrium . Le t us a ssum e tha t th i s is not the ca se ,i .e. the ad option of
the sec o nd b est con tract deri v e di n p r opo si tion 2 l eads to the e lec tion a nd ree le ction
8
Iw ould l ik e to s tre ss the f ac t that thi sa s sum pti on is wi th o ut loss of ge nerali t y .12
of pa rt y1 . T he a ssum ed r eel ecti on i m pl ies that, i np e r io d 1, the t w ot y p es separate
and the ￿rm r ev e al s its i nfo rm at i on . H o ww ou l d the opp ositi o n part y react, i f it could
free ly c ho os e a new m anifesto a t the in term e diate el ecti o n? It kno ws that the el ectorate
v ot e s for the part yw h i c hd e liv ers the h i gh e s t s o cial w elfare. It further k no w s that pa rt y
1 is b o und b y its old co n tra c t. In order to b ecom ee l ecte d, the opp os i tion part ym ust
com m it to a second p e rio d con tract, whic h wil lb e a c cepted b y the ￿rm a nd o￿ e rs a
higher s o cial w el fare t h an the go v e rning part y’ s con tract. In the cas e that the ￿rm is
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), where "> 0. T h e ￿r m wil l pre fer the con tract
to the o ri ginal one, a s it lea v es the hi g h cos t ￿rm w i th a stri c t po si tiv e ren t. I ti s easy
to s e e tha t ,f or s m all ", the new con tract re su l ts i na h i g her so c ial w e lfare than the
original o ne: Th e ￿rm pro duce s alm ost e ￿ci en tl ya t av e ry sm al l ren t. The fa c t that
part y2 i s, b y a ssum ption, una bl e to a dopt a new m an i festo at the in te rm edi at e e le ction
is of no m atter. A t the ￿rst el ecti o n it could sim ply com m it to a t w o- p eri o d con tract






). It w ou l dt he nb e e l ecte d at the in t erm e di ate
el ecti on , if the ￿ rm turns out to b e of h i gh cost. The a ssum ption that the second b est
con tract l ea ds to an el ecti o n and re ele cti o n o f part y1l e a ds, therefore, to a con tradicti on .
Co nseq uen tl y ,w e arriv ea t t he f ol lo wing insigh t.
Le m m a1 If p ar ty 1 o￿e r s the se c ond b est c ontr ac t, it c an not ex p e ct to b eb oth el e cte d
and r e ele ct e d.
Obs e rv e that the o ccurrenc e o f the in te rm edi at e e lec tion giv es rise to the ra tc het e￿ect.
T h e op pos i tion part y has the p o ssibi li t yt o r e nego ti at e w i th the ￿rm ab out the con tract
and m a y win the ele cti on b y incorp o rating the i nfo rm at i o n whi c h the ￿rm rev eals i n the
￿rst p eri o d. T he ￿rm ’ s b eha vi o r, there fo re ,i n￿uences the e lec tion outcom e a nd thereb y
the con tract under wh i c h it ha s to op erate i n the future. Co nseque n tly , its i ncen tiv es
concer ni ng the i nf or m at i o n rev el at i o n are disto r ted.
In order to determ ine th e equi li brium outcom e o f the g am e und e r scenario 1, w e
ha v et ot a k e the ratc het e￿ e ct in to a cc ou n t. Note tha t v oters do no t ha v ea n i ncen ti v e
to ele ct the opp ositi o n part y , when it cannot p os t a prog ram whic h o ￿ers a higher
so ci al w el fa re . Th i si m pl ies that if the go v e rn i ng part y’ sc o n tra c ti sex p ost e ￿ci en t,
it wil l b e reel ecte d. M or e ov er, only suc ha r e neg oti at i o n-pro of co n tra c t guara n te es the
ree lec tion of a g o v erni ng pa rt y . The o b vious candidate fo r the equi li brium con tract is
there fo re the o pti m al r e ne g otiati o n-pro of con tract. This c on tra c t wil li ndeed b e p art y 1’s
eq ui li brium con tract, i fi t also e n sures pa rt y 1’s vic to ry at the ￿rst el ect ion . T o sho w that
this i s the ca se ,w eh a v et o c hec kw h e ther part y 2 ha s a p o ssibi li t y to p os t a pro gram
whic ha c hiev es a higher so ci al w e lfare tha n the op ti m al rene g otiation-pro o f c on tract.13
Fi rs t, i ti sc l ear tha t a n y o the r renegotiation- pro o f c on tra c tw i ll no t lead to pa rt y 2’s
el ecti on . P er de￿niti o n these le a d t oal o w er so ci al w e lfare tha n the op ti m al rene g otiation
pro of con tract. No w a ssum e that part y2w ou l d get el ecte d at the ￿rs t e lec tion b y
o￿ er ing a prog ram whic hi sn o tex p ost e￿ ci en t. T hi si m pl ies that, at th e in t erm e di ate
el ecti on s, it w i ll b e replace db y part y 1. Since v oters an tic ipate this c ha nge, they will
v alue pa rt y 2’s pro gram b y substituti n g th e sec o nd p eri o d co n tra c t for part y 1’s e le ction
winning pro gra m .F rom the vie wp oin t of a ra ti o nal v ot e r, part y2 ’ s progra m i s , therefore,
ide n tic a l to so m e renegotiation- pro o f con tract. Again, this con tract cann ot le a d to a
higher so c ial w el fare than the o pti m al rene g otiation pro of con tract. W e there fo re a rri v e
at the fol lo wing prop o siti on :
P rop osit ion 3 In e quilib r ium p ar t y1o ￿ er s the optimal dy na m ic r en e gotiation pr o of
c ontr ac t. It is el e cte di np er io d 1 and r e el e cte di np er io d 2. Wel fa r e is strictl y l ower than
in the c as e w ithout an in terme diate e le ct io n.
Th e m o del with an i n term edi at e e le ction a nd a renego ti ation p os si bi li t y of the opp osi-
tion part yi s therefore e quiv ale n tt oam o del with no in term e diate el ect ion s i nw h i c h the
go v e rn m en t is una bl et oc om m it to ex p ost ine￿ cie n t con tracts. Cons e quen t ly , scenario
1 i s equiv ale n t to the m o del a naly zed in La ￿o n t a nd Tirole (199 0). The o c currenc eo fa n
i n t e r m e d i a te el ecti o n and the p o ssibi li t y o f t h e op pos i tion to renegotiate m a y there fore
ex pl ain wh yg o v ernm en ts tend to b e u nable to com m i t not to renegotiate. I tm ay b e
seen as a jus ti ￿cation of the ad ho c a ssum ption in L a￿ on t and Tirole (1 99 0).
5 In te rm ediate elec tio n s without c om m itm e n t
In this secti on I analyz e the p oli tic a l ga m e when the con tract whi c h the go v er ni ng pa rt y
write sw i th th e ￿rm i s not binding for the other pa rt y . The only d i ￿e rence to the previ ou s
scenario i s that i f t h e o ppo si tion part yi se l e cted, the ￿rm c a nnot i ns i st on the exe cution
of th e o l dc on tra c t. If the ￿rm re fus e s to ho nor the new con tra c t, it i sl eft with his old
outs i de option of z ero. This m a yb e s e en as a sm all di ￿ ere nce, but has a stro ng i m pact
on the e quil ibrium outcom e .
Th e ￿rm ’ sr e fus al to acce p t the con tra c to fa ne le cted o pp o si tion pa r t yl i m its the
barg aini ng po w er o f the opp osition part y .I n con tras t to the prev ious s c enario, the ￿rm ’s
option to ref us e i s w ors e a nd, in thi s sense, i tw i ll a c cept a larger ran ge of con tracts. This
seem st og i v e a bigg e r pla yi ng ￿eld to the o pp o si tion pa rt y .I tn o w can o￿ e r a con tract
whic hy iel ds the ￿rm on l y its reserv ation pa y o￿ o f ze ro , i ns te ad of m atc hing the pa y o￿
as so c iated wi th the con tract of t h e prev ious g o v ernm en t. This see m st om ak em atters
w orse fo r so ci al w el fa re . Surpri si ng l y , thi si s not ne cessa r ily the c a se.14
A t the in te rm edi at e e le ctions v oters w i ll c ho ose the part y whic h pro m ises the highest
so ci al w el fare in stag e 2 . D ue to the s y m m e tric inform ation b e t w ee n the pa r ties and the
el ectorate the v oters’ c hoic e is straigh tforw ard. The v oters wi ll com pute the exp ec ted
so ci al w el fa re whic h eac h part y o￿ ers an d v ot e f o r the pa rt y with the highest w elfare.
Reason i ng i n the sa m ew a y a si nt h e previ o us sec tion w e arriv e at the fo l lo wing insi gh t:
Le m m a2 If p ar ty 1 o￿ers t he op ti m al l ong te r mc ontr ac t, it c an not ex p e ct to b ee l e cte d
and r e ele ct e d.
It is alsoc lear that i n equi libri um pa rt y1 m ust g e t ele cted and re ele cted. A n y other
outco m ec a nnot b e sus taine db ya ne quil ibrium .I n a n ys i tua ti o n in whic hp a r t y 2 gets
el ecte d i n som ep e rio d, pa rt y 1 cou l dc op y part y 2’s co n tra c t for tha t p e rio d a nd, due
to the ti e-breaki n g rule, g e te lec ted instead o f pa r t y2 .
Le m m a3 In e q uilib r ium p arty 1 g ets el e ct e da n dr e el e cte d.
As under s c ena ri o 1 the opp ositi o n part y ha s an adv an tage o v er t he g o v e rn i ng pa rt y
when the c on tra c t induce s the ￿rm to re v e a l pa rt of i ts inform ation. T he o ppo si tion
part yi sa b l et o i nc o rp ora te the i nfo rm at i on i n t oan e wm anif esto , while t he g o v erning
part y is tied to its o l dc on tra c t. Li k ei n sce na ri o 1 , the go v e rning part y can re ac tt o
t h i s proble mb y a dopting a s e cond p e rio d c on tra c tw h i c h do es not lea v e t he o ppo si tion
part y the o pp o rtuni t y to use the i n term ediate rev el at i o n o f inform ation rev elation to its
adv an tage.
In con trast to scenario 1 , ho w ev er, there e xist an alte rna ti v ew a y fo r the go v erning
part y to pre v en t the opp ositi o n part y’ s ree le ction. Th e g o v e rning part yc a n giv e the
￿rm a b ond i n the ￿rst p e rio d whic h the ￿rm ha s to pa y bac ki n p eri od t w o. By using
al a rge b ond the g o v erni ng pa rt yc a n ensure its re ele cti on at t h e i n term edi at e e l ecti on .
Thee l e ctorat e ,n a m ely ,w i ll a n ti ci pa te c o rre ctly that if it v ot e s for the o pp o siti on part y ,
then th e b o nd w i ll b e l o st and e xtra taxes ha v et ob e r a i sed. T o see this con si der that
under s c ena ri o 2 the ￿rm ’s o utside option when c o nfron te d with a new go v e rnm en ti si t s
original o utside option of zero. Cons e quen tly , the ￿rm can c ircum v en tp a ying b ac k the
bon d i f it rejec ts the ne wc o n tra c t an d o pts i ns te a d for i ts o utsi d e option. Th i sm e an s
that the opp ositi o n part y cann ot appro pri a te the b o nd, where as t h e go v erning part y can .
It fo l lo ws tha t if t he o ppo si tion part yi se l ecte d, i t ha s to raise m o re distortiona ry taxes
than the go v e rn i ng pa rt y , whic h can use the re turned b o nd for k eepi ng taxe sl o w. A s the
rationa l e lec to rate an tic ipates a l l this, i tw i ll v ot e f or t h e go v erni ng pa rt y ra the r than
the opp os i tion pa rt y if the b ond is s u￿ cie n tly l a rge.
Note tha t in scenario 1 the use of b onds di d not all evi at et he g o v erning part y ’s
ree lec tion proble m . There the ￿rm ’ s outs i de o pti o n wh e n faci ng the con tract o f the new15
go v e rn m en ti s t he ol d con tract. The ￿rm do e s not ha v e a p o ssibi li t yt oc i rcum v e n tp a ying
bac k the b o nd. If i tr e ject san e w con tract, it is s t ill tied to the ol d one.
Th e use o f b o nds r equire s that the go v e rnm en t has to raise ex tra ta x es i n the ￿rst
p erio d i n o rder to pa y the b ond to the ￿rm .O n the other hand , i tn e eds less ta x es in
the second p e rio d, as it can us e the r eturned b ond fo r that. Thi si m pli es tha t taxes are
not sm o o the do v er the p e rio ds, but are deli be ra te ly sk e w ed.
Le tm e deri v e the m i ni m al b o nd whic h ensures tha t the sec on d b e st c on tra c td o e s
n o t g i v e th e opp ositi o n pa rt y the opp ortunit y to win a n in term e diate e le ction. Si nc e the
t w o- p e rio d second b est c on t ra ct induce s the t yp es to s e pa rate in p eri o d 1 , th e re d o es not
ex ist a n y a sym m etri c inform ation a t the ti m e of the in term e diate el ecti on . G i v e n that
the old con tract b e com es redunda n t when a c han ge of g o v ernm e n to c c urs , the op p os i tion
part y can pro m is eas o c i al w el fa re o f at m ost W
h ￿ ￿
in the ca se of a high co st ￿rm and
W
l￿ ￿
i n the c a se o f a l o w cost ￿rm .A c cordingly , the m i nim al b o nd, B
h
, w hi c h ensures
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If the distortion o f ta xe s, expressed b y the func tion ￿,i sl i near the use of b o nds
is costle ss . I n thi sc a se part y 1 can c o stl ess l y resolv e its ree le ction pro bl em . I n the
￿rst p erio d it h as to use the second b est con tract together w i th a b ond of siz e B .B y
in terpreti ng the co n v e xit yo ft a x at i o n as t h e exi stence of a cro wding- out e￿ect, w e a rri v e
at the fol lo wing prop o siti on :
Prop osit ion 4 If t a x ation ha sn oc r owdin g- o ut e￿ e ct ( i.e . ￿
00
(: )= 0 ), t he e q uilib r ium
c ontr ac t m ak es use of a b o n d of at l e ast B .S o cial we lfar e in this c ase is W
￿
and the
ex isten c e o fa ni n terme diate ele c tion do es not im p air so cial w elfar e.16
If the distortion i sm arginall yi ncreasing i ns i ze, i. e. if ￿
00
> 0, the use o f b o nds
in v olv e sas o c ial c o st. Pl ac i ng a b ond requi res the co l le ction of e xtra ta x es in p eri od 1
a n d the ne ed for l ess ta x es of the s am ea m ou n ti n p e r io d 2. Whe n the tax d i sto rti on i s
m arginally incre as i n g, the distortion o f the e xtra ta xe si np e rio d 1 w i ll b e l ar g er than
its re duction i np e r io d 2. Placi ng a b o nd all evi at es pa rt y 1’s re ele ction conce rns , but
at a cost of m ore a ggrega te tax di s tortion. T hi si m plie s tha t the se co nd b est con tract
tog e ther wi t hab o n do f s i ze B m i gh t not le a d to the ele cti o n of pa rt y 1’s in the ￿rst
p erio d. Due to the cost a sso ci at e dw i th the b o nd this c on tr ac t y ie lds less tha n a so ci al
w el fare o f W
￿
and m a yi m ply that a di￿eren tc on t ra ct e xists w hi c h atta i ns m o re.
Iw i ll no t try to deri v e the o pti m al c on tract expl ici tly for this c a se. La ￿o n t and
Tirole (1 988 ) h a v es h o wn the di ￿cul tie s in ￿nding the optim a l con tract. The p roble m s
in o btaini n g the o pti m al c on tr a ct a re sim i lar here . The m ost general one c an s a yi s
that the o pti m al c on tr ac t m a y , p oss i bly ,m ak e u s e of a bon d i n o rder to all evi a te the
ree lec tion p roble m .
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Theref or e ,w e ob tai n the foll o wing prop ositi on
P r o p o s i t i o n 5 The e q uilib r ium c on tr act is g en er al ly n ot the o pt i mal dy n ami c non -
c ommi t ment c o nt r act . Howe ve r , if the e quil ibri um c on tr act do es n ot make use of a b ond
it is the optimal dynamic non -c ommitment c ontr a ct .
I t m a y b e s u r pr ising that without a c ro wd i ng -out e￿ect so ci al w e lfare in e quil ibri um
is the sam e as without an i n term ediate ele cti on . This r esult w a s not o btained in the
scenario of renego ti at i on . There the e xistenc eo fa ni n term e diate el ecti o n alw a y sr e du c es
so ci al w e lfare. The r esu l ti se v en m ore s urpri si ng g i v e n the fact that sce na ri o 2 see m s
to giv e the opp ositi o n pa rt yal arg e r pla y ing ￿el d. T hi si s a c tua l ly no t the cas e . If the
go v e rn i ng pa rt y o ￿ere d the ￿rm a long term con tract with a larg e b o nd, the op p os i tion
part y canno t o￿ er a co n tra c t whi c ho b l iges the ￿rm to pa yi tb a c k. The ￿rm w ould
dec line s uc h a con tra c t. Unde rs c enario 1 , h o w ev er, the ￿rm ha s to pa y the b o nd ev en i f
it reje cts the c on tra c t. Therefore, there exi s t con tracts whic h the opp ositi on pa r t y can
o￿ er under sce n ari o 1, but not under sc ena ri o 2 . C onseque n tly , the opp ositi o n part y ’s
pla y ing ￿e ld un de r sce na ri o 2 is not g e nerally l arg e r.
6 AC ase Study
The arg um e n to ft h i s p ap er dep ends c ruciall yo n t h e idea tha t re gu l at i on i s pol iti call y
im p ortan t a nd that regulation is ulti m ately d e vise db y p oli tic a l pa rti es. I n thi ss e ction
9
Si nc e the use of a b ond has a direc t ￿rs t o r der e ￿e ct, it m a y b e that the use o f b onds, ho w ev er
sm al l, is sub o pt i m a l.17
Iw ou l dl i k e to s ubstan tiate th e se cl ai m s with a n actual c a se s tudy o f th e 19 97 g e ne ra l
el ecti on i n the U nited Ki n gdom .
1 0
In the Unite d Kingdo m the 80 s w e re c ha racte riz ed b y the priv atisation of larg e publi c
util iti es, s uc ha st e lec om m uni ca t ion s, rail , gas , w ater a nd ele ctric it y . Sinc e suc h util iti es
are natu ral m on op o l ies, th e ir pri v at i sa ti on r e quire d subseque n t regulation in order to
prev en t the ￿rm s fro m e xploiti ng thei r custom ers. Althoug h the priv atisation pl an s
t h e m se lv es w ere hea vi ly deba te d, the q ue stion ho wt o r e gu l at e w as l ess con tro v ersial and
rec eiv ed m uc hl e s s atten ti on .
Only after the regu l ato ry sc hem e sw ere i np l ac e and the ￿rm s presen te d the ir ￿rst
pro￿ ts ￿g ure s , the sc hem e sb e g an to attract s c rutin y . By the 1 990 s i tw as c lear, that
the uti liti es w ere g e ne ra ti ng m uc hh i gh e r pro ￿ts tha n ex pe cted and b on us pac k a ges
li nk e d i t to extr em ei ncreases i nt op m ana gem en t’ ss a l ar y . Ap u b l ic outcry resul ted
and the opp osition pa rt y , L ab o ur, cri tic ize d the go v e rnm en t and d e m anded a c h ange
in re gu l at i on . T he go v erni ng part y , the Cons e rv at i v e s, h o w e v er stuc k to its regulation
sc he m e.
In 1 99 5 L ab our started to expre s s the idea th at, wh e ni ng o v e rnm en t, i tw ould li k et o
i m p ose a wi n dfall pro ￿t tax o n util iti es to pa y for tra i ning sc hem es.
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T o t he ut i li tie s’
r e l ie f the Cons e rv at i v e sd e cide d not t oi m plem en t L abou r ’ si dea the m selv es.
F o c u si ng on the general e lec tion o f 199 7 L ab o ur started expre ss i ng i ts idea o f a windfall
tax m or e often. B y July 4, 199 6, T on yB lair, the l ea de r of the L ab our part y ,c om m i tted
its part y to lev ying the w i ndfa l l tax b yi ncludi ng i ti n the part y’ s dra ft m an i festo. The
part y ,m or e o v e r, considere da m ore funda m en tal o v erha ul o f the regulation sc hem es
than just a cre a m ski m m i ng o f exc ess pro￿ts . A pl a n to recast actual pri ce con trols w as
dra wn up.
1 2
B yN o v e m be r 1 99 6 L abou r a nnounced tha t the tax w as i n te nded to ra i se
o v er 5 bill ion p ou nds. A l ea k ed, inde p ende n tr e p ort i ndicated tha t m ost uti li ties could
com fortably a ￿o rd a lev y of that siz e and that the s to c k m ark et ha d a l ready broa dl y
discoun te d at a x of a round 5 bil lion.
1 3
In the 199 7 e le ction c am pa i g n the utili tie s ’ reg ul at i on and the windfall tax p l a y e da
m a jor role . It form e d the cornerstone of the ￿ rst Lab our Budget. Labou r ’ s 3 0-pa ge m an -
if esto m en t ion s th e windfall tax l evy o n pri v at i ze d util iti es o n three s e pa rate o ccasions .
The ta x l evy e v e n rang e dh i gh i n L abou r ’ sc or e e lec tion p l edges:
Ple dg e 4: ge t 250,00 0 under-25 ye ar - olds o￿ b en e￿ t and in to work b y u s in g
1 0
F o otnote s refe r to the elect roni c iss ues of t he UK news pap er The Dai ly T el eg ra ph, whic ha r e acce s-
sibl e under the in t erne t addres s h ttp:// www.telegraph.co. uk .
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mone y fr o maw i n dfal l l ev y on the p rivatize d utilitie s.
Th e i m p o rtance o f the le vy b ec om es c lear when recall ing Lab our’s fate a t the previ ou s
general e lec tion. L abou r h a d l o st t h e se e l ecti on s e v en thou gh p ol ls ha d predi cted a
vi ctory . The reas on w as tha t in the last m i n ute m an yv oters c ha nged the ir m ind ab out
La b o ur, b e ca use they w ere afra i d that L ab our w ou l dr ai se i ncom e taxes. A t the 199 7
general e le ction i tw a s the refore c rucial tha t La b our w ou l d con vi nce the v ot e rs tha t i t
w ould not raise i ncom et a x es. T ot he v ot e rs the windfall tax l evy m ad e La b o ur’ s clai m
con vi nci ng . A s con ￿rm ed b yi ndep e nden te x pe rts , the l evy w ould b e large enoug h to
fund L ab o ur’ s p rogra m . T he le vy re pr e sen ted th e on l y pol iti call yv i ab l em ea ns to fund
La b o ur’ se x pe ns i v e job creation pro gram . L ab our exp ecte dv oters to a c cept the tax
b ecaus e of the public hostil it y to the h uge p ro￿ts of the priv atiz ed uti li tie s and the ro w
o v er " fat cat" sa l aries a nd sha re options.
L e t m e ca st the exam pl ei n term so fm ym o del. First, the fa c t tha t b oth pa rti es w e re
surprised ab o ut the hi g h p ro￿ts after priv atisation indi cates that they w ere not i nfo rm ed
ab out the e ￿ci ency o f the uti li ties. I td o e ss e em l ik el y that the uti li tie st h e m sel v e s did
inde ed kno wm ore ab o ut the ir e ￿ci ency . T he regulation o f the util iti es to ok, therefore,
place u nde r asym m etri c inform ation. Sec o nd, sinc e there w as relati v e ly l ittl e debate
ab out the re gu l at i on s c hem e sw h e n they w e re dev ised, b o th partie ss e em e d to b e equall y
inform e d ab out the s tate o f the uti li tie s . Giv en their inform ation they b eli ev ed to use the
righ t regulation sc hem e. Thi rd , the pro ￿t ￿ gures re v e al ed part of the uti li tie sp r i v ate
inform ati on . The ￿g ure s sho w ed tha t the uti li ties w er ea c tua l ly qui te e￿ cie n t. The
go v e rn i ng part y ,h o w ev er, w a s com m i tted b y its regu l at ion sc he m e and did no t dare
to c han ge the sc he m e to incorp orate the rev eale di nfo rm at i on . As, at the tim e, m ost
el o que n tly expl ai ne db yV i c Coc k er, the c hie f exe cutiv e of one of the biggest w at er
com panies: "In a w ay the g overnme nt has a c ontr ac t with sh ar e holders and t hey w ould
noth a v e honor e di ti f t h er e had b e en a chan ge in t he gr oun d rul es."
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Theo p po si tion
part y , on the o the r ha nd, di d no t feel ti ed to the g o v ernm e n t’s s c hem e. I t h ad al w a ys
ex pr e ss e di ts re se rv at i o ns concerni ng the g o v erni ng pa rt y’ s priv ati s ation p r o gra m . A
sta te m en to fA lan M ilb ou r n , Lab our’s shado wT reas ury sp ok esm an , esta bl ishes that
L abou r i n te n ti on w as , i ndeed, to e xploit the inform ation whic h cou l d b e learned from
the util iti es’ b eha vi o ur: "The windfal l gains made b y a few show that the utilit i es c an
a￿or da w i n dfal l le vy that w il l hel p t he many."
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L ab our’s adv an tage a t the g e ne ra l
el ecti on w a s the refore e xactly a s m o del ed i n this pap e r. Finall y , it s hould b e notic ed that
L abou r w on the 199 7 el ecti o n and is no wc hang i ng r eg ul at i on . There fo re ,e v en tho ugh
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the original g o v ernm en tw as gen ui nely c om m itte d to its long term re gu l at i on s c he m e,
the com m i tm e n tw as un d e rm ine d due to an i n term ediate el ecti o n. Thi s is exactl y w hat
this pa p er add re ss e s.
1 6
F r om thi s exam ple w e can a l so see that L ab our’s strategy c o nform sm o re to the
scenario of no n-com m i tm e n t than to the rene g otiation one. Apparen tl y L ab our fe els it is
not tie dt oa r eg ul at i on s c hem e whic hi s dra w n up u nde r the Cons e rv at i v eg o v e rn m en t.
As a result th e l ega l case of th e tax w as h e a vil yd i sp ute d. La b our m ain ta i ned that
the le vy w ou l d" b e set within the law" a nd poi n ted to an e ar l ier instance at whic h the
Co nserv ativ es ha d p e rfo rm ed a s i m i lar c ream sk im m ing of e xce s s pro ￿ts.
1 7
The u ti li tie s,
h o w ev er, thre at e ned the L ab our gov ernm en t with l a w sui ts , i fi tw ould i nd e ed im p ose
its i n tended tax le vy .T h e yw ere bac k e db yA i m sf o rI nd ustry , a Co nserv ativ es-funded
think - tank, w hi c h a rgued tha t the ta x l evy w ould b e i ll eg al on four acc ou n ts.
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Ho w ev er,
after the o v erwhel m i ng vi ctory of the La b our pa rt y an d after th e size a nd detai ls o f the
tax lev y w ere re v e al ed, the util iti es b ac k e dd o wn a nd deci ded no t to c halle ng e the l evy .
7 C on clus ion and Disc uss io n
This pap er s ho w e d tha t a p o l iti ca l ec o nom ym a y explai nt h e l i m i ted com m itm e n t whic h
is ob se rv ed of g o v ernm e n ts. The ex plana ti o n do es no t dep end o n the fact tha t so ci et y
m us t put cons trai n ts on the g o v ernm en t’ sp o w ers. Tha t is, the li m i ted com m i tm e n t
is not s om e o pti m a l resp onse to a non -b enev olen tf eatu re o f go v ernm en ts . Th e o nl y
non -b enev ol en t feature of thi sm od e l is that p oli tical pa r ties w an tt ob e e l ecte d. In
eq ui li brium they m axim ize so ci al w e lfare under the re s tri cti on t h at the y are re el ecte d.
This a ssum ption s u￿ ces to obta i nt he l im ite dc om m itm en to f g o v ernm e n ts.
Th e pa p er studied t w o sce na ri o’ s. One i nw h i c h the o pp o siti on part y ca n only rene-
go ti a te and one in wh i c h it can a c tu al ly o ￿er a c om pl ete ly new c on tra c t. These scenarios
m a y b e see na st w o p olar c a ses. The as sum pti o n tha t the opp o siti o n pa rt y ca n renegoti-
ate a con tract of the form e rg o v ernm en ti sa ne x trem e ly w eak on e .T h e re hard l ye xists
a reas on wh y this sho ul d n ot be t h e c a se. T he a ssum ption tha t the o pp o si tion part yi s
not binded at a l l, will generall y b e to o sta rk . Also g o v ernm en ts ha v e to o p erate wi thin
the l a w and cons ti tution o f the ir coun try . As m y case study indi ca t es, i n practi ce an
opp os i tion part y’ s pla yi ng ￿e ld wil ll i ei n b e t w ee n the t w o p olar cases. P oli tical pa rti es
1 6
Note that m ym o de l is to o s i m pl y to expla in wh yt h e C o n ser v ativ eg o v ernm en t did not an ticipate
Lab our’s st rategy or did not safeguard its r eelec tio n. An e xtens i on of the m o de l in whic h parties a lso
ha v e prefe renc es o v er di￿e ren t p oli ci es m a y explai n this fa ct .
1 7
Elect roni cT elegraph Marc h 19, 1997
1 8
Elect roni cT elegraph Jan uary 12 ,1 9 9720
can do m or e than j u st renegotiating form e rc on tra c ts when the yc om ei n to o ￿ ce. An
in teresti ng questi o n is ho w thi s pla y ing ￿e ld is determ ined.
Th e a nsw er to this questi o n wil l b e closel yl i nk ed to the m uc ha n a l yzed ￿el do fh o w
so ci et ym a y ￿nd a solution to the p roble mo f l i m ite dc om m i tm en t.
19
The l ite ra ture of-
fers t w oo b vi o us soluti o ns to the pro bl em .F i rst, so ci et ym a yr e s tri ct the go v e rnm en t’s
po w ers b yl a w an d constitution. Tha t is, so ci et y giv es the go v e rnm en t rule s rather than
discre tion. Sec o nd, t h e dec ision is d e le g ated to p o l iti call yi nd e pe nd e n ti ns ti tutions. The
prob l em with these soluti on s i sc l ear. The a reas for whi c h this sho ul d b e done, are exactl y
thos e areas where pa rti es c an ac hie v em uc h p oli tical ga i n. Restra i ning a go v e rnm en t’s
po w er b y con sti tution or de m an di ng it to hand o v er t he po w er to an i nd e pe nd e n t insti-
tution m a yb eq u i te di￿ cult. Note that th e p oli tic al m o del in this pa p er i s to o sim ple to
ana l yze these so l u t ion s a nd their e￿ect o n regulation. In equil ibri um the winni ng pa rt y
rec eiv es all the v ot es and w i th s uc h a n a bsolute m aj o r i t y acti ng go v ernm en ts a re a bl e
to c hang e l a w and con sti tution. M ym od e l could there fo re n ot ex pl ai n the com m i tm e n t
po w er b e hind la ws and c o nstituti on .
Th e drivi ng force b e hi nd m y result of li m ite d com m i tm en ti st h a ta no p p o s i tion
part y tri es to tak ea d v an tag e o f ne wi nfo rm at i o n, whi c hi sc reated b y a no n-p ol itic al
third part y’ s b eha v ior. I studie d thi s in the con tex t o f a ￿rm with priv ate i nfo rm at i on .
One m a y ,h o w e v e r, also apply the m o del to o ther ￿el ds of p oli tics. An ex am pl ew ould
b e rep eated nego ti at ion unde rp r i v at e inform ation in whic h pa st negotiations m a y signa l
priv ate i nf or m at i o n concerni ng future nego t iations .
Th i s p ap er ha s sho wn that a si m ple p oli tic a l econo m ym a y expl ai n th e fa c t tha t go v-
ernm en ts are unable to resist re nego ti at i on . Th e p ape r t he refore sho ws tha t the ad ho c
as sum pti o n tha t go v ernm en ts a re unab l e to resi s t renegotiation m a y b e seen a s a sim pl i-
fyi ng assu m ption whic h can b e jus ti ￿ed b y a p oli tical econo m y .I n this resp ect I w ould
li k et on o t e t h a ts i nce Dew a tri po n t (198 6) ob se rv e dt h a tex ante o pti m al con tracts m a y
be ex p ost ine ￿ci en t, a q uite f u ndam e n ta l debate has started whether s uc h con tracts
are enforce ab l e, i.e . ac ceptable .
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The p r ag m atic a rgum e n t is that ex p ost i ne￿c ie n t
con tracts wi ll a l w a ys b e renego ti ated, si nc e the re i s no reaso n w h ya n y o ne wil l pre v e n t
the c on t ra ct ing p arti es fro m m utual b ene￿c ial re neg oti at i o n. Arguing from a d i ￿e ren t,
m ore con tract theoreti cal p e r spe c tiv e one c ou l d see the l im ited com m i tm en t due to rene-
go ti at i o n as an u nm o del ed, ad ho c i nc om plete ness. I n pri nci pl e, re ne g oti at i on m e an s
that p arti es a re u nable to i nclude a cl a use i n their c on tra c tw h i c h forbids the parties to
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rene g otiate. This incom pl etene s s is no t ex plained an d ex o genous l y enforced.
Th i sp a p e rm a y b e seen as fo l lo wi n g the l atter app r oa c h. I n a sp eci ￿c ec o nom i c
en vironm e n ti t￿ n d sag e n uine ex pl an ati on f o r lim ite d com m i tm e n tb y obta i ning it en-
dog enously . Giv en the ex istenc eo f s u c ha ne xplana ti on , a n ad ho c as sum pti o n of li m i ted
com m itm e n tm a yt he nb es e e na sa m o del ing s hort cut in e n vi ro nm e n ts in whic h the
ex pl an ati on ap p l ies. A ni n tere st i ng topic for future researc hi s to ￿nd other ec o nom i c
en vironm e n ts i n whi c h con tractual incom pl etene ss m a y also ari se e nd ogenou sl y .
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